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ABSTRACT
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are massively seeping into a wide range of human activities. Along with 
other remotely controlled or automatic devices, they have entered many aspects of human activities and industry. 
While the majority of researchers have been working on the construction, deployment and non-military use of 
UAVs, the protection against UAVs remained on the edge of their interest. Nowadays, the situation is rapidly 
changing. The risk of misuse of UAVs by criminals, guerrillas or terrorists has compelled authorities, scientists and 
defence industry to face this threat. Organisations have launched crucial infrastructure defence programs to cope 
with UAV threat. To solve this problem, it is necessary to develop disciplines improving the air space surveillance 
and UAVs elimination techniques. The substantial aspects of the UAVs detection and elimination were analysed, 
being supported by a number of conferences, workshops and journals articles. The contribution of the study in the 
Counter–UAV area consists particularly in generalisation and evaluation of the main technical issues. The aim of 
this paper is to emphasise the importance of developing new scientific fields for countering UAVs, and hence it is 
directed firstly on the scientific audience.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Unmanned aerial vehicles have already become an 
integral part of military, security and rescue services. They 
are commonly used even for leisure activities. However, due 
to lagging legislation, the UAVs have not yet officially joined 
the common airspace for piloted vehicles and hence they still 
cannot be deployed for wider commercial use – for example by 
logistic companies1. 
Scientific-research teams, students, professionals as well 
as amateur enthusiasts drive this aviation field forward. Groups 
of skilled (or less skilled) aircraft engineers, programmers, 
operators and UAV users are growing rapidly all over the 
Europe and the whole World as well2. As analysed and then 
stated3, ‘The world of unmanned aviation is a very impatient 
innovative world’. This generates new options for scientific 
development.
Due to the undisputable advantages, the UAV 
technologies are widely used for military purposes. Aside 
from regular military utilisation, they are being used with 
increasing frequency by paramilitary and guerrilla (criminal) 
organizations. It should be noted that the negative exploitation 
of the unique features of the UAVs is not happening in the 
criminal groups only. People trying to take an original selfie, 
tabloid journalists disturbing celebrities, or individuals 
capturing extreme adrenaline video shots can endanger e.g., 
aircraft take-off procedures. And even here – in the field of 
protection and defence against such exploratory and invasive 
UAV activities – there is a wide range of scientific disciplines 
that could be driven forward by this phenomenon.
2. RESEARCH AREAS FOR UAVS 
DEVELOPMENT
Regarding the entire unmanned aerial system (UAS) of 
which the aircraft (UAV) itself is a one part, one can define 
research areas that can be approached from the technological 
or the operational point of view4. This issue, including a 
significant focus on military domain and its connection to 
NATO documents, has been thoroughly analysed5. 
As discussed by Demir5, et al. it is also possible to identify 
weak, still lagging problems, requiring new technical solutions, 
and thus directing relevant R&D activities. For these reasons, 
the scientists and technicians are trying to scale the levels of 
maturity or the levels of sophistication presently achieved 
within scientific disciplines related to UAS construction and 
operation. Based on analyses, studies and experiments, the 
authors suggest the scaling of below stated levels.
The degree of sophistication presently achieved in the 
individual scientific disciplines related to UAS construction 
and operation can be evaluated. Based on analyses, studies and 
their own experiments, the authors suggest the evaluation to be 
conducted as follows: 
• Performing a correlation between research areas (applying 
Czech Government resolution7 and its enclosure8) and 
UAV configuration, or the legal and social aspects of their 
operation. In the first column of Table 1, this is collectively 
referred to as Aspect.Received : 02 January 2018, Revised : 09 April 2018 
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• Think-tank or expert evaluating the existing degree of 
sophistication.
• evaluating the given r&D area in relation to UAS.
• evaluating the need to achieve some considerable progress 
in the corresponding branch of knowledge.
Qualitative correlation, followed by an evaluation were 
carried out (inspired by methodology5, Table No5). A five-
degree scale was created for the expert evaluation.
low  ...................................................‘l’ 
Bellow moderate ................................‘BMod’
Moderate ............................................‘Mod’
Bellow mature ....................................‘BMat’
Mature ................................................‘Mat’
The grades in Table 1 were given from subject matter 
experts (SMEs) evaluation questionnaire. SMEs were chosen 
from the following branches – Ground Based Air Defence 
(Czech), Aircraft construction (Czech), Air Forces (Czech).
SMEs were not able to make a consensus of which aspect 
should have higher weight than the other, so all aspects have the 
same weight. Some aspects were not evaluated by SMEs. That 
was in case when most SMEs were not able to evaluate certain 
aspect according to the branch of knowledge. The final level 
of aspect maturity was given by stating the centre of gravity 
(while all aspects have the same weight considered). E.g. the 
platform aspect has two evaluated braches of knowledge (ICT 
and Geogr.). one has below mature preferences and the second 
moderate preferences. Than the final aspect maturity was stated 
as moderate in this case. That was because most of SMEs voted 
moderate decision in case of Materiel engineering branch, than 
below moderate decision in case of Mechanical engineering 
branch. The centre of gravity of opinions in case of material 
engineering branch was stronger (there were more the same 
opinions).
Analysis of the results in Table 1 and the subsequent 
evaluation show that, from a technical point of view, the 
unmanned system can be classified as ‘Moderate mature’. 
To conclude the above, the massive development of UAS 
technology is outgrowing user, legal, moral, and military-
political frameworks. These facts indicate the direction of the 
future research, development and applications.
3. AIR THREATS AND AIR DEFENCE 
TECHNOLOGY
Scientific research organisations (both military and 
security) have started to investigate possible ways of protection 
against UAVs relatively recently. This mostly concerns the 
‘mini-UAV’ and smaller categories9. 
The problem of defence is principally built on three 
fundamental pillars (the term ‘pillar’ as a supporting element 
of any logical framework is used according to NATO 
terminology):
(I) Air Surveillance: This includes: the detection, 
recognition, localisation, and identification of an aerial 
object;
(II) Command and Control (C2) of all resources included in 
an AD system;
(III) Elimination of the aerial object – if it poses an AT.
logically, defence against larger UAVs (Class II and III 
according to nATo UAV classification) is associated with 
the defence against standard threat (an aircraft).With the 
Table 1. UAS sophistication quantification
Technical view Operational view
Branch of knowledge   ICT Geogr. Mech. 
Eng.
Mater. 
Eng.
Electr. 
Eng.
Civil, Social & 
Politics
Military No. of branches 
included
Maturity 
of aspectAspect   ↓
Platform   BMat Mod    2 Mod
Propulsion   Mod BMat BMod   3 Mod
Avionics and control BMat BMat BMat Mod BMat   5 BMat
Payload   BMat Mod BMat Mod Mod 5 Mod
Autonomy Mod Mod      2 Mod
Ground equipment BMat BMat Mod BMat Mod   5 BMat
Ground h/M interface Mod    Mod   2 Mod
Support elements Mod  Mod  Mod   3 Mod
Operation - Higher levels      BMod Mod 2 Mod
Operation - Tactical levels       BMod 1 BMod
Training      BMod Mod 2 Mod
C2 and Communication BMod    Mod  BMod 3 BMod
Certification      low BMod 2 BMod
legal issues      low low 2 low
Moral and ethical issues      BMod Mod 2 Mod
Number of aspects Included 6 3 6 5 7 6 8 The whole 
maturity of UASs:
Mod
Maturity of a single branch Mod BMat BMat Mod Mod BMod BMod
Maturity of the particular view Mod BMod
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Table 3. The significance of the AT parameters to the AD pillars
                       Pillar →
Parameter ↓
Reccon. C2 Elimination Parameter 
significance 
MTOW Small Small Crucial Small
Dimensions High Relevant High Significant
Operation radius High High Significant High
Maximum altitude AGl High High Relevant Significant
operation altitude AGl Crucial High Crucial Crucial
Useful payload Small High High Significant
Maximum speed High Crucial Crucial Crucial
Radar cross-section Crucial Relevant Relevant Significant
Acoustic signature High Small Significant Relevant
IR signature High Small High Significant
Platform robustness Small Small Crucial Relevant
EW resistance High High Significant High
Self-protection Significant Small High Relevant
Take-off distance High Crucial Small Significant
Attack distance High High Crucial High
Max. cost Small Small High Small
Table 2. Typical standard ATs and small UAVs characteristics 
comparison
Parameter, aspect Standard AT 
(e.g. F-16 
fighter)
Class I, 
Categories 
Mini and Micro
MTOW [kg] up to # 1000 < 20
Dimensions [m] 5 + < 2
Operation radius [km] up to # 100 < 50
Maximum altitude AGl [m] 18 000 + < 1500
operation altitude AGl [m] 50 + < 300
Useful payload [kg] up to # 1000 < 10
Maximum speed [m.s-1] up to 700 + < 60
Radar cross-section [m-2] 1 < 0.2
Acoustic signature [dB] > 100 # 10
IR signature/engine 
temperature [°C] 
500 + < 200
Platform robustness middle - high weak - low
EW resistance high, active none, minimum
Self-protection active + passive none
Take-off distance from 
attacked object [km] 
up to # 100 up to # 1
Attack distance from an 
attacked object [km]
up to # 10 up to # 0.01
Max. cost [USD] up to tens of 
millions
thousands
Note: The symbol ‘#’in Table 2 means ‘several’.
introduction of completely new ways of using small UAVs 
(the ‘mini’ and lower categories) has led to a reassessment of 
the approach to Ground-Based Air Defence Asset technology 
and its operational use in the case of possible small UAV 
elimination. Table 2 shows a general comparison of distinctive 
AD-related characteristics of standard ATs, like a supersonic 
fighter29 versus Mini UAVs ‘Class I’30.
Using principles of the expert evaluation methodology 
(like in5), a five-degree scale was devised: 1 - Small; 2 - 
relevant; 3 - Significant; 4 - high; 5 - Crucial. This scale 
expresses the significance of a given parameter with regard to a 
given AD pillar. Qualitative assessment was chosen according 
to air defence SMEs’ and authors’ experience.
Table 3 reflects the degree of significance of the selected 
AT parameters with regard to the individual AD pillars.
In case of  ‘MTOW’ and Platform robustness’, the SMEs 
evaluation is ‘Small’, ‘Small’, ‘Crucial’, while the output 
(parameter significance) is ‘Small’ in case of ‘MToW’ and 
‘Relevant’ in case of ‘Platform robustness’. That is because the 
evaluation ‘Crucial’ in case of ‘Platform robustness’ was more 
frequent (stronger).
Table 3 shows in fifth column, that from the AD realisation 
point of view, the key parameters (i.e. ‘Crucial’ and ‘High’) of 
aircraft are: 
• operational altitude during mission execution, 
• Maximum speed during mission execution,
• The distance at which aircraft are able to affect defended 
object (operation radius),
• eW resistance,
• Attack distance.
4. RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT TO 
MEET THE C-UAV CAPABILITIES
The defence against UAVs through the 
implementation of measures in air surveillance, C2 
and elimination domain assumes the creation of 
a complex system of sophisticated technological 
solutions. There is also a need for improvements in 
readiness (alert) system and adequate legal framework 
through most of command and control levels. When 
applied to CUAV issue, some of the measures require 
a completely new and specific approach.At the end 
of the air defence process, the chain of events must 
lead to such elimination of the UAV that the mission 
consequences, intended by the enemy, are completely 
neutralised or at least minimized.
The three AD pillars are further discussed in the 
context of defence against small UAVs.
4.1 Air Surveillance
Air surveillance and the information acquired 
about the aerial situation constitute the primary 
conditions for countermeasures.The gathered 
information is ideally without gaps in sensor coverage 
and distributed in real time. Nano, micro, mini 
and small UAVs have specific qualities with respect to their 
detectability – small physical dimensions, minimal effective 
radar cross-section  (RCS), low emissions of thermal and 
acoustic energy10 and flight envelope (flight in low altitudes, 
relatively low speed, high manoeuvrability).
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4.1.1 C-UAV Sensor Technology
Devices for small UAV detection must, therefore, include 
the widest possible range of the electromagnetic spectrum (and 
possibly the acoustic and optical). Their deployment must also 
be adapted to detection-influencing factors11. 
for the detection, localisation, and identification of small 
UAVs, the following technologies can be generally used:
- Active radars capable of detecting targets with a small RCS12,13
- Passive radar systems using various methods (such as 
passive coherent location (PCl))14.
- Infrared sensors15.
- laser devices16.
- Optical surveillance aids and devices17,19.
- Equipment operating with image recognition technology.
- Acoustic devices20.
- Devices capable of detecting and localising UAV remote 
control signals18.
- A human air observer, possibly also equipped with any of 
the technology mentioned above.
The processing of initial information about the possible 
location of the UAV can often be highly challenging, since the 
size of signals containing this information is often only barely 
above (or even below) the threshold of a clutter21. The problems 
are especially in the urban area22.
To increase detection probability during air surveillance, 
the deployment of a spatially distributed multispectral sensor 
framework is expected. 
4.1.2 C-UAV Sensors
Based on the list of sensor types listed above and with 
respect to UAV categories, we can define tasks that need 
to be solved. Then, for each task, we have to define a clear 
research goal (or goals) in order to meet the desired final goal– 
elimination of the enemy UAV. 
Among the most important tasks related to the detection, 
localisation and identification of small UAV are:
- Measuring RCS23.
- Selecting proper radar frequency band.
- Optimising methods of suppressing the radar clutter24.
- Optimising passive radiolocation methods25.
- Selecting detection equipment parameters in the visible 
and infrared spectrum.
- Improving methods for range measurement26 with optical 
rangefinders.
- Improving methods of selecting useful signals and 
suppressing acoustic clutter on the background of the 
UAV flight28. 
- Developing electromagnetic signal scanners in UAV 
remote control bands, including location identifiers.
- Developing automated (or even automatic) analysers and 
fusion algorithms for better UAV tracking.
- optimising fields of sensors to detect UAVs in a given 
combat environments.
4.2 Command and Control
In principle, command and control systems suitable for 
the defence against small UAVs are similar to standard C2 
systems, already used in the Air Forces. 
For further analysis, let us assume that in the ‘surveillance 
segment’ (see 4.1.1), the true target is successfully isolated 
from the clutter, correctly localised and identified, and the C2 
system receives already pre-processed information containing 
all necessary characteristics of the target. 
4.2.1 Command and Control Technology for C-UAV
While countering the air threat, the task of the system is 
to acquire information from the sensors, fuse it, determine the 
(if possible) optimal task distribution for its effectors, assign 
a specific task, supervise its completion, and possibly take 
follow-up measures depending on the task assessment. Next 
task for C2 technology is the direct preparation of fire and fire 
control.
4.2.2 C-UAV Information and Communication 
Technology
The above-mentioned tasks and requirements of the C2 
also lead to the other issues:
- Fusion of target data, which is often incomplete and being 
transmitted over a relatively short time.
- optimising the decision-making process affected by:
• Terrain configuration,
• Sudden appearances of a UAV - often when it is no 
longer possible to effectively intervene,
• Short period when the UAV is present in the effector 
Kill Zone,
• The complexity of decision-making process about 
target allocation to available effectors, such as anti-
aircraft machine guns, cannons, directed energy 
weapons (DEWs) and electronic warfare (EW) 
devices,
• Collateral damage, for example the impact zone of fired 
projectiles, where own troops or civilian population 
can be expected.
- Completing the often fragmented information about the 
results of tasks carried out by effectors, e.g. the need of 
the quick determination, if the UAV was hit or not.
- Data flow problems
• Maximum data flow of effector control channels
• frequency compatibility of different sources of 
information
• Compatibility of data links
- Minimising the number of elements (levels) in the fire 
control loop and the C2 chain itself.
- Assigning competencies and delegating them to the lowest 
degree (preferably to fire units).
- Information encryption and confidentiality.
4.3 Elimination
Several methods and corresponding means can be used 
to eliminate an AT in the form of a small UAV. In principle, 
methods of elimination can be divided into destructive and 
non-destructive.
4.3.1 C-UAV Effector Technology
Feasible destructive or disruptive methods include:
- Destruction by way of the kinetic energy of firearm 
projectiles
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• Scatter (shotguns, pellet guns)
• Single bullet
- Concentrated beams of electromagnetic energy - DEW 
• high-frequency
• laser
- Partial destruction of a UAV, preventing it from continuing 
its flight
• Intercepting nets (fired at a UAV using a special 
projectile or delivered by another aircraft)
• Water or foam cannons (for short distances only)
• Special ‘anti-drones’31
• Trained birds of prey (an ‘ornitho-counter-attack’),
- Destructive effects of explosive anti-aircraft missile 
warheads.
Non-destructive methods can be utilized mainly by 
affecting the UAV (or other components of the UAS32) 
electronically:
- Jamming
• Control signals being transmitted from the operator to 
the UAV33,34,
• Signals being broadcasted by the UAV to its operator 
(usually video),
• Signals used by the UAV for flight control and 
stabilisation (GPS, GlonAS, GAlIleo)35,
• Sensors located on-board the UAV.
- Infiltrating the UAV control loop (protocols) and taking 
over the UAV control.
To obtain information about the mission of the enemy 
UAV, one can also monitor its activity or obtain information 
from signals directed towards its user. This does not destroy, 
nor eliminate the UAV, however, in certain situations one may 
use such information to take adequate countermeasures.
from a defensive perspective, a UAV in flight is a small, 
low-flying, suddenly appearing, rapidly manoeuvring object 
for more details in36. If we summarise all the typical technical-
tactical characteristics of a flying UAV, we are left with a 
synergic effect in the form of a challenge like none that air 
defenders have faced for several decades.
4.3.2 C-UAV Effector Research
The portfolio of problems related to the effective 
elimination of a flying UAV is so extensive that the following 
list mentions only selected fundamental issues for further 
research and/or development:
- Guiding the effector to its aerial target (missile guidance 
methods, anti-drone pathfinding, aiming the cannon).
- Sufficient time necessary to track the threat in order to 
eliminate it effectively.
- Weapon optimisation: type, calibre, effective range, 
mobility.
- Terminal ballistics of kinetic weapons.
- energy ratios needed to destroy a UAV in flight using a 
DEW beam37.
- The electromagnetic field intensity necessary to disrupt 
aircraft electronics.
-  Electronic warfare challenges:
• Disrupting control signals
• Breaching remote control signal protocols to enter the 
UAV remote control loop
• GPS spoofing
- effector deployment optimisation with regard to the 
battlefield, environment and possible collateral effects.
- Methods for the military/police special forces training 
designated to UAVs destruction (disruption).
Therefore, the elimination of a flying UAV38 is so complex 
that it cannot be resolved by a single universal effector in the 
near future40.
4.4 Related and other Relevant Measures
To defend an area or an object against UAVs, a number 
of measures must be taken. In general, it is always preferable 
to avoid an unfavourable situation before dealing with it. 
From a legislative point of view, legal standards related to 
UAV acquisition, operation, and control must be created and 
consistently enforced41. The task of security forces is to protect 
the external borders of the country from the penetration by 
forces, able to deploy and misuse UAVs.
C-UAV measures are to be implemented through the air 
defence units mostly for wartime. However, C-UAV measures 
are very important in conjunction with civilian security 
organisations and forces also during peace and crisis time in 
the form of precautionary measures saving civilian and military 
infrastructure and population.
5. DISCUSSION
SMEs evaluations presented in the paper are based 
on the experience of the air defence and air forces experts. 
some experts are skilled in tactics and combat procedures 
(commanders of air defence units) while the others in aircraft 
technology (technicians, researchers). That means that from 
their perspective, the answers are shaped by their own specific 
experience. That’s why the published outcomes and priorities 
could be slightly altered by each country or defence industry 
organisation, according to their level of operational and 
technological maturity. 
6. CONCLUSIONS
In the field of military technology, as well as in the 
application segment of scientific research, several issues 
are still waiting to be resolved. The author’s department is 
attempting to address some of them (within their capabilities39) 
 both analytically and through technical experiments. The 
subsequent synthesis offers the output for the operational use 
of the ground based air defence.
Many results from the ‘C-UAV’ field have already been 
formulated and presented in some way38,42. But the problem to 
link them up with the Air-defence pillars, according to authors’ 
knowledge, was not published. The conducted study presented 
in this article can improve directions of the development to 
meet the C-UAV capabilities.
Also, the intention of this article is to publish the output in 
a comprehensive professional-themed form here and to present 
it in the way that includes both components of the defence 
against UAS- the technical view and operational view.
The outputs of this work are now used as a portfolio of 
challenges for C-UAV research within the authors’ institution. 
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There is authors’ conviction, that other individuals and bodies 
can use it, develop and elaborate too. This will contribute to 
the effort to improve the air defence against hostile unmanned 
aerial vehicles, or systems.
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